


## Statement of the research methodology and guideline for “Survey for Rojhelat.”

“Survey for Rojhelat” is a study to understand today’s Eastern Kurdistan Region’s realities through a diverse body of questions in the form of a survey. For our work, establishing a data-driven ground for future studies regarding the socio-political climate of our subject matter is essential. We recognize that it is better to accompany discourses with measurable facts to form any hypothesis on the Kurdish people’s agency for an equitable and progressive future. While we do not claim any generalizability nor embrace such viewpoints, we argue that this study maintains a great level of accuracy which stems from the methodology in recruiting participants and the employed logic in establishing different correlations within the survey. In the absence of physical access to the population of Kurds and creating random sampling and recruitment, we took a few extra measures to distribute the survey than what is common in online polls. We combined random sampling and snowball processes to ensure the participants were from highly diverse social backgrounds, ages, cities/villages, and levels of education. The survey was first distributed by direct messaging from a large volunteer group to rural and urban parts of Rojhelat. We established bounce-back protocols asking our volunteers to report if, within villages and cities, the survey has been circulated and returned to them by a random contact or via telegram or WhatsApp groups. After this phase, we started putting the survey on social media platforms. We purposefully avoided advertising on prominent media outlets, people with large numbers of followers on social media, and platforms that could create homogeneity. These extra steps were combined with highly restrictive codes disallowing multiple entries and a strict monitoring process to filter out cyber attacks, coordinated participation, and rigging. This study prioritized the quality and distribution model over the number of participants. We understand that recruitment is difficult given the security climate created by the Iranian government, and that generates unforeseen issues. Still, we are determined to expand our recruitment population and equalize the number of participants based on gender, sexuality, and Kurdish dialect. A highly successful model we have employed is the study’s multilingual nature, which will further be expanded in the future. This aspect allowed our study to gain extra cross-referential and correlative data that are extremely helpful in understanding the attributes and connotations of the socio-political landscape in Kurdistan. Building a multilingual study in nature is challenging to navigate, but it allows us to scratch many surfaces and provide in-depth findings about Kurdistan. Our models in this study will enable us to avoid propagative, populist, and media-oriented rhetoric and focus on a discursive analysis of Kurdish society in Rojhelat and the future beyond. One of the reasons for creating a survey that expanded from religion to women, language, and politics was to establish hypotheses, correlations, and analytics models to understand issues of colonialism, political participation, assimilation processes, Kurdish literacy, and gender disparities. We have relied on volunteer and collective work to create this study, establish this platform, recruit, distribute, translate, and every other aspect of the work. There has been no monetary support of any kind

from any party or entity from the start to the finish of this project. We thank all of the people who wholeheartedly helped with the study. This study became possible through the volunteer work of many individuals who spent time on this project instead of being with family or resting after long working days. We salute you all who participated in this survey and helped us assemble a study worthy of your time and patience. Without you, none of this would be possible. We aspire to create better, more holistic, and inclusive studies with all Kurdish varieties and dialects.

**3158 Submissions**


<b>2123 Sorani Kurdish</b>	<b>67.2%</b>
<b>898 Farsi</b>	<b>28.4%</b>
<b>137 English</b>	<b>4.3%</b>



From 2123 Submissions in Kurdish, 1988 participants accepted our terms and conditions to participate in the survey. That number in Farsi is 799, and in English 131. So, naturally, the report will reflect on 2918 participants in total.


Through a vast network of people who aided us in spreading the survey evenly across the Sorani-speaking regions of Rojhelat, our recruitment of participants was exceptionally successful in diversity among the people who participated in the study.

The percentage of the participants residing in Rojhelat Kurdistan and/or inside Iran to the participants from the diaspora. (Time Zone differences and other information available to us as markers of the location of the participants allowed filtration of inaccurate answers).




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66% of the participants currently live in Kurdistan or a city in Iran across all those who filled out the survey in all languages. The second largest group of participants completed the study from Europe at 24.57%. Finally, 9.43% of the participants participated in North America and other locations, respectively.



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
The percentage of participants who completed the survey who live in Rojhelat or a city in Iran to those in the diaspora is very high. While the ideal ratios could be closer to 85% to 15%, we will keep our depictions based on the number of participants and not the population distribution. This is due to the issues of access to the internet and the major disinformation campaign in Iran against any kind of survey.

However, our distribution model increases our accuracy to a great level of acceptance. In this regard, our accuracy is close to 77.64 out of 100.


However, based on the participants' provinces and the gathered population of Kurds, our depiction of the diversity of attitude is highly accurate in the Sorani-speaking region of Rojhelat Kurdistan. While we do not have such a level of accuracy depicting the perspective of the Gorani/Southern Kurdish speaking of Rojhelat, the study has successfully illustrated attributes that are extremely important to those regions for future studies and socio-political projections.

For example, by cross-referencing the primary language of the participants to participants from the Provinces of Ilam and Kermashan (Kermanshah), who make up 23.6% of the total participants, we observe that nearly half of them have picked Sorani as their main Kurdish. This information helps us to locate those participants in the northern Kermashan region. However, cross-referencing allows us to argue that the vast majority of participants want education at all levels in Kurdish, regardless of location, dialect, or religious beliefs.


**Distribution of participants using the Sorani Kurdish, based on Provinces**



**Distribution of participants using the Farsi language, based on Provinces**



**Distribution of participants using the English language, based on Provinces**



502 Kermashan- Ilam-Other locations- 23.6% of the total


368 Southern Kurdish and Gorani - 12.6% of the Total

88 Kurmanji- 3%


### Age Distribution

The study shows a high level of accuracy in the depiction of age groups of participants compared to the age groups announced by the Iranian Census Bureau based on the percentage. This is another element in our argument that despite the limited number of participants, we have been able to reach people from all age groups in an appropriate way.


#### Kurdish



#### Farsi




#### English




### Participation based on gender:

602 or 20% of the participants identified as female. Only 15 people picked “other,” and 2031 identified as male, which is 80% when combining the entire pool of participants across the languages.


#### Kurdish






#### Farsi



#### English



## Employment




50% full-time employed, 16% Student, 13% part-time employed, 9.8% Unemployed, 4.2% Seasonal job, 3.8% retired, 2.6% Fulltime Dad/Mom, and 0.6% military service.

Through region-to-region direct requests by our aids, we contacted many rural Kurdish populations across the Sorani-speaking region. Many farmers consider themselves seasonal workers. To make sure, we double-checked with our local aids to report to us if the survey had circulated so that a random person had texted back to them or found them on locals' telegram channels.


The distribution based on this category reflects a high level of accuracy in reaching target populations.

Education level


### Kurdish



### Farsi



### English




The distribution of the level of education with available data shows high accuracy in representing target populations. This allows us to arguably state that this survey has successfully captured the socio-political attitude of the Sorani-speaking Kurdish population in Rojhelat. However, a fascinating pattern we can point out from studying the figures across the survey shows that Kurdish literacy has no direct connection with the higher education level amongst the Sorani-speaking Kurds in Rojhelat (More on this page 20-29). In other words, having a college degree, regardless of the level (Bachelor, Master, and Ph.D.) among the participants, does not correlate with their level of Kurdish literacy. We argue later this is a generalizable pattern across Rojhelat Kurdistan.


## News Sources

The following figures, while exhibiting the participants' news sources, also depict the differences and similarities between those who answered the survey in Kurdish and those who used Farsi or English.


### Kurdish



### Farsi






## English






Social media across the board has the highest percentage concerning news sources for the participants. However, Farsi news sources drastically have less audience amongst those who took the survey in Kurdish than those who took part using Farsi. Specifically, the Rojhelat political parties' TV channels have the highest audience after social media for those who answered in Kurdish; then it is Southern Kurdistan TV channels. Iran International TV is third. We can see Manoto TV stands even lower than Iran's State TV. The figures can point us to the issue of media representation and measuring elements of assimilation and agency in relation to Kurdish literacy since most participants are Sorani-speaking Kurds. On the other hand, the participants who used the Farsi language get their news from Iran International TV at a much higher percentage than Kurdish-speaking TV channels. While these entities have entirely different paradigms politically, we argue that there is a relation between comfortability level with the Kurdish Language in terms of understanding and political views regarding Kurdistan issues. Additionally, across the board, we are witnessing a distrust in TV platforms like Manoto.

### Questions regarding Religion and Political Religion




The percentage of being religious or not across the board is homogenous. Those who stated they are religious in Sorani, Farsi, and English surveys are 10%, 9%, and 6%, respectively, and in total, 9.6% of the participants.



Across the board, the absolute majority believed in the separation of religion and state. Religious beliefs are personal, and the government cannot intervene in such matters or side itself with any religion. This finding supports the argument that even religious Kurds believe in the complete separation of state and religion entirely.






The participants answered a question regarding the financial means of religious institutions, and the vast majority supported that such institutions' budgets cannot come from the government or taxes. The distribution of answers was also homogenous. This supports the idea that those who consider themselves partially religious either support the fact that religious institutions cannot be supported by tax money or don't hold an opinion against it. However, the numbers show, almost the same percentage of those who identify as religious do not support the idea.






### Women and gender equality.

In answering whether the participants believe in Gender equality regardless of sexual orientation, we witness total support across the board irrespective of the language. However, the average percentage of those who disagreed with that statement is 3%, and about 9% don't have an opinion in this regard. This finding allows us to conclude that a large percentage of those identifying as religious support Gender Equality in Kurdistan.






Concerning women's sovereignty over their bodies, the findings show vast support regardless of religious orientation or the language participants used.




It is the women who have sovereignty over their bodies.






Relationships between adults without marriage are personal and have nothing to do with the state or society. The percentages of participants' opinions on this topic are the following: 10% disagreed, 9% had no opinion and 83% in Kurdish, 7% disagreed, 10% had no opinion, 83% agreed in Farsi, and 5%, 4%, and 91% in English. There is a direct correlation here to the percentages of those who identified as religious or partially religious. The collected data shows us that about 84% of those who disagree with this statement are among those who identify as religious. Those who hold no opinion are the majority among those who are partially religious.



The numbers drastically changed regarding the participants' opinion on the statement: "Any form of systemic or domestic violence against women (physical, physiological, sexual and...) should be outlawed." Across the board, the absolute majority averaging 98%, support outlawing violence against women.



Concerning political participation, regardless of gender as a human right, we witness the absolute majority supporting it irrespective of religious orientation.




We argue that our data in this regard is highly accurate, reflecting the realities of Kurdistan concerning religious tendencies, women's rights regarding dress codes, political participation, and sovereignty over the body. Additionally, our data supports what we have witnessed during the past few months regarding personal freedoms and the call for the separation of religion and state. Finally, another extremely noteworthy aspect of our study showcases the level of progressive thinking in Kurdistan regarding issues of gender. This study reflects all voices we have heard on social media and during street demonstrations that the Kurds do not want a regime that interferes with political and social freedom, personal choices, and religion.

### Kurdish education and literacy:


The following section of this report reflects on the participants' opinion on Kurdish literacy, the right to study the Kurdish language, how they perceive Farsi, and the possible attributes of language disparities in Kurdistan.

In this section of the study, we relied on academic findings on language issues, for example, how languages flourish or disappear or what the meaning of Lingua franca is and how it may apply to the Kurdish context. We started by asking about what Kurdish variety the participants spoke.

What is your primary Kurdish Language (what Kurdish language/dialect are you more fluent in or use)?




90% of those who took the survey in Sorani are Sorani-speaking, 3.7% Gorani-speaking, 2% Kalhorri-speaking, 2% Kurmanji-speaking, and 2.1% indicated to speak a different Kurdish variety. In comparison, less than 0.5% indicated they spoke Laki. Therefore, the data suggest that 10% of the participants are non-Sorani speaking and could take the survey in Farsi but had enough Sorani literacy to answer all the questions in Sorani Kurdish.



Amongst those who took the survey in Farsi, the speakers of Kurdish varieties other than Sorani made up a more significant percentage (31.5%) than those reflected in the study in Sorani (10%). These percentages are the following: 11.5% Kalhorri, 5.1% Gorani, 4.5% Kurmanji, 2% Laki, and 7.4% a different Kurdish variety. However, 69.5% of the participants indicated that their Kurdish variety is Sorani, and they chose to take the survey in Farsi rather than Sorani. In the meantime, amongst those who took the survey in Farsi but indicated their main Kurdish variety is Sorani, we see a higher percentage of college degrees at the Masters




and Ph.D. levels. In other words, more Sorani speakers with higher education have completed the Farsi survey than Sorani-speaking participants without higher education. By cross-referencing data, we can argue that current language politics, graduate degrees, and Kurdish literacy do not correlate.

The only substantial change in the ratio of the participants regarding their Kurdish variety in the English survey is 10.7% Kurmanji-speaking Kurds which shows a significant increase in numbers compared to others.




Posing the question, "At what level and in which fields should there be education in Kurdish?" we see another consensus among the participants regardless of what language they chose to participate in the survey. The numbers from the Kurdish and English data are quite similar in selecting the option "Education in Kurdish should be at all levels and every field of education (88.8%)."

Among the mentioned group participants, only 8.7% stated that Kurdish Education should only be at the K12 level. However, among those who took the survey in Farsi 74% were in favor of education at all levels in Kurdish, 14.3% were in favor of education in Kurdish only at the K12 level, and only 4.1% picked "Kurdish education in elementary school only."




Strictly in Sorani Kurdish, we asked the participants, even in the English and Farsi versions, if they knew how to read and write Sorani well and how they learned it. The question propped the participants that if they did not understand what was stated, they could pick the last option: I cannot read or write in Sorani Kurdish.

The figure below exhibits that 75.7% of those who took the survey in Sorani learned reading and writing in that variety by themselves. 11.4% stated they learned in private classes, and only 7.9% indicated that they had learned it from their parents. The latter finding points us to argue that most participants born in the last 50 years are raised either by parents who grew up during the Pahlavi regime or started going to school as the Islamic Republic took over the country. In both governments, systemically, Kurdish education was/is sanctioned by the state strictly, and access to physical, educational books before the age of the internet was difficult. Kurdish is neither the medium nor the subject of education at any level of primary or secondary school level. We argue that the assimilation process of the Kurdish language has steadily continued since the early 1900s. This assimilation campaign by the state has been challenged by the promotion of the language via digital technology, the Internet, and language activism, including private courses offering Kurdish lessons.




We see a large percentage of Sorani illiteracy among those who took the survey in Farsi. These are primarily participants who speak varieties other than Sorani, yet more than 6% have stated to possess Sorani literacy. We will follow up with more data regarding the statistics reflected in this question. 61.2% of this group, regardless of their dialect, are self-taught, 5.6% learned in private classes, 6.6% learned from their parents, and 24.9% stated they do not know how to read and write in Sorani or cannot understand the question entirely.



- خونم فیلری خونم کردووه
- دایک و باوک یان کهمسگملیتیر
- فیلریان کردم
- له کلاسی تایبیدا فیلر بیووم
- له مدرسه‌ی دهولیتی فیلر بیووم
- سورانی باش نازانم بلنوسم و بخویلتمهوه

61% of those who took the survey in English have learned Kurdish literacy by themselves, 13% have learned from their parents, 3% from private classes, and 3% in public schools. Given that 80% of the participants are from the Kurdish diaspora and 75% of the entire pool age-wise can fit the second-generation profile, we can conclude that regardless of the location and generation, access to Kurdish literacy is a significant challenge. Additionally, it is established that most Kurds from Rojhelat, irrespective of their Kurdish variety, have learned Kurdish literacy through self-teaching.



- خونم فیلری خونم کردووه
- دایک و باوک یان کهمسگملیتیر
- فیلریان کردم
- له کلاسی تایبیدا فیلر بیووم
- له مدرسه‌ی دهولیتی فیلر بیووم
- سورانی نازانم بلنوسم و بخویلتمهوه


Click here if you don't understand the...

To further our knowledge about the disparities regarding the right to learn the Kurdish language in formal education, we must establish and create studies that include all the Kurdish varieties used in Rojhelat. We aspire to take on that task as soon as possible, especially studies that can expand our knowledge of Southern Kurdish varieties in Rojhelat, dialects, Kurmanji literacy, and associated issues.

The topic of Shared/Bridge Language and Lingua Franca.


To establish a further understanding of the complexities facing the Kurds in Rojhelat, we asked our participants about their views on language diversity in Kurdistan. The data shows that people prefer a multilingual education system that allows equal and equitable access to languages and literacy. To that end, we asked: If Rojhelat, like any other democracy, achieves independence or stays in the political geography of Iran, in what kind of Kurdish language the people of Rojhelat should communicate with one another?

The vast majority, 84.5%, believe Kurdistan should protect and sustain its language diversity instead of upholding one or two varieties as the official language/s.



Understanding that during the past hundred years, Iranian states have sanctioned the education in the Kurdish language while heavily investing in Farsi as the sole language of instruction, we found it paramount to ask the participants what they thought of Farsi. While academically, Farsi does not fit the description of lingua franca (shared/bridge Language), we offered this term in reference to Farsi as an option alongside other terminologies that are relevant in post-colonial linguistic studies. The description of the lingua franca or bridge language we provided was the following: A third language that is not the language of either of the people who do not share a common language-most common lingua franca is English.


**Posing the question “What is Farsi to you” to the participants who took the survey in Kurdish,**  
49.5% identified it as a “killer language” (in post-colonial studies, a killer language is a language that causes the death of other languages due to governmental policies or its colonial history). 37.8% identified it as a forced language, and 10% identified it as a shared/bridge language.



**For those who took the survey in Farsi, the percentages for the same question changed to the following:**  
41.7% identified Farsi as a shared language or lingua franca, 30.9% identified it as a forced language, and 23.7% perceived it as a killer language.

Comparing the two results, we see that among those who took the survey in Farsi, there is a 31.7% increase in identifying Farsi as a shared language, but still, 54.6% of the participants do not have a favorable view of Farsi.

To those who took the survey in English, the statistics are the following:



To gauge the level and depth of the participants' Kurdish literacy, we asked them to describe their understanding of a segment of a Kurdish poem. We chose this poem since it has diverse word samples from different Kurdish dialects. We found the highest level of understanding among those who took the survey in Sorani. However, among those who took the survey in Farsi, the majority had an excellent to good knowledge of the poem. The same level of understanding could be found among those who took the survey in English.

We asked the participants the following question about the Kurdish language: How important is it for you the progress/empowerment/flourishment of the Kurdish language?

**Among those who took the survey in the Kurdish Sorani,**

92.6% It is a fundamental issue and the Kurdish Nation's right.

7% It is very important but not a fundamental issue.

0.3% It is a good thing but not important to me.

0% it is not important at all.

0% no opinion (The graph does not show the last two options because both were at 0%).



**The numbers among those who took the survey in Farsi are the following:**


82.5 % It is a fundamental issue and the Kurdish Nation's right.

12.1% It is very important but not a fundamental issue.

3.3% It is a good thing but not important to me.

1.3% Not important at all.

0.9% No opinion.



**The numbers among those who took the survey in English are the following:**


89.3% It is a fundamental issue and the Kurdish nation's right.

6.9% It is very important but not a fundamental issue.

1.5% It is a good thing but not important to me.

0% Not important at all.

2.3% No opinion.



The results in the three languages are quite similar in the sense that the vast majority of the participants have deemed Kurdish very important and fundamental to the Kurds. Those who completed the Sorani survey scored the highest on this item (92.6%), followed by the English version (89.3%) and Farsi (82.5%) being the lowest. By the same token, whereas both the Kurdish and English versions show 0% for the item "not important at all," 1.3% of those who completed the survey in Frasi thought that Kurdish is not important at all. The percentage is small, but it's notable when compared with the Kurdish and English versions.

This study's diverse body of questions aims at creating correlating attributes between age, level of education, location, religious orientation, views on gender equality, Kurdish language literacy, and political views. We understand each one of the topics can be further studied and investigated separately in depth. However, to establish a base for future studies, we require a set of information to form appropriate hypotheses to follow up. Hence, we asked the participants questions regarding today's Kurdistan political complexities to set such a foundation for our future projects.

These questions span from the right to self-determination to Kurdish political parties' relations, possible alliances, and what people think about today's political dilemma due to the current uprisings.

To establish the participants' political tendencies and attitudes, we first established the question of in what condition they believe their rights will be protected. To create a system that allows multiple scenarios while allowing obvious political choices. We relied on the slider system to grade different governance systems based on what they perceived as their personal/citizen right.

We recognized that multiple choices utilize slider format that the participants could rate from Zero to Ten provides a various set of data. This increases the reliability of data instead of multiple choices systems in which one answer could only be picked, reminiscent of voting systems. Through this process, the anxiety of voting gets reduced, and it also allows us to measure elements such as homogeneity, polarity, and complexity of political tendencies. This system adds to the cross-referencing of the collected data across three available languages.

The following question was asked: In your view, how far each one of the below statements can guarantee your rights on a scale of 0-10?

**The average among those who used Kurdish is the following:**

Average



**The average among those who used Farsi is the following:**

Average



**The average among those who used English is the following:**



This data set shows us among the participants who used Kurdish; there is a consensus on an independent Kurdish state. It also displays a great deal of homogeneity in political attitudes. Comparing the table to those in Farsi and English may beg the question of why such low averages for the options.

This is due to the polarizing rates chosen by the participants amongst those using Farsi or English, which nullifies each other's ratings. However, even among such polarizing political attitudes, options 1 and 2 have a higher approval rate across the board.

To further help to put this question in perspective, we can look at the entire participants. This is possible by combining all participants across the three languages and mixing the whole Pool with most of them using the Sorani language on a scale of 2.36 (Sorani Language) to 1(Farsi+English).

**The result looks like the following:**

5.7 For An Independent Democratic Kurdish State

4.1 For A Federal Kurdish Government within Iran


2.3 For A Democratic Iranian Government in which Kurds and Kurdish Parties can participate

This section displays a general distrust of any Iranian Government that would not entail a form of Kurdish autonomy. Much more could be argued here, which we hope to expand on in the short future. Moreover, the participants do not find whatever alternative to the current regime appealing. While there is a sense of urgency in fundamental change emerging from Kurdistan, this urgency has a specific political logic.

In today's colonial discourse, the view of the actual or hypothetical colonial subjects is exceptionally vital for any socio-political projection or comprehension of the target population.

To such end, we simply asked this question: Do you consider Kurdistan an occupied land?

**94.5% of the participants who took the survey in Sorani Kurdish said: YES**




**Among those who took the survey in Farsi, the results are slightly less homogenous.**


67.3% Yes

18.3% NO

14.4% No Opinion




**Of those who took the survey in English, 81.7% YES, 9.9% No, and 8.4% No opinion.**




The following section of the report expands on the participants' views on both internal and external Kurdish Parties' affairs. We aimed to establish a further understanding of how the people of Rojhelat analyze these topics. Such knowledge can assist us in our understanding of Kurdistan's political players to create a holistic approach to the current analytical challenges at hand. The rest of the figures will display questions and the distribution of the answers and percentages. We will expand on this report segment further in the short future.

In your view, shall the Kurdish political parties with armed forces bring all of their troops under an organized and unified commanding entity/committee?


**The survey in Sorani:** 88.6% YES, 3.8% NO



**The survey in Fars:** 78.2% YES, 5.5% NO




**The survey in English:** 85.5% YES, 3.1% NO




Shall Kurdish Political Parties for the advancement of the Kurdish people's/nation's demands form a united front?


**The survey in Sorani:** 96.5 YES



**The survey in Farsi:** 86.7% YES, 4.4% NO




**The Survey in English:** 88.5% YES, 2.3% NO




Do you agree with the Kurdish Parties to form a united front with other (non-Kurdish) political entities/forces/parties who do not recognize the Kurds as a nation? (Here, it was made clear that recognizing the Kurds as a nation entails the acceptance of the Right to Self Determination even though in the [U.N Charter of Self-Determination](#), both colonial countries and peoples are recognized).


**The survey in Sorani:**



**The survey in Farsi:**




**The survey in English:**




Do you support the Kurdish parties to form an alliance or a united front with Monarchs (Reza Pahlavi)?


**The survey in Sorani:** 78.6% NO, 12.4% Yes.



**The survey in Farsi:** 67.7% No, 17% Yes.




**The survey in English:** 71% No, 16% Yes.




Do you support the Kurdish parties to form an alliance or a united front with the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (Mojahedin E Khalgh)?


**The survey in Sorani:** 73.2% NO, 8.8% YES.



**The survey in Farsi:** 78.1% NO, 6.5% YES.



**The survey in English:** 67.9% NO, 9.2% YES.



Do you think the Persian/Iranian opposition represents your demands? (Rate from 0 to 10)

**The survey in Sorani:**

Average

**1.1**

**The survey in Farsi:**

Average

**1.4**

**The survey in English:**

Average

**0.1**

How would you rate the Persian media in accurate and neutral coverage of the Kurdistan events and Kurdish people's political demands(Rate from 0-10)?

**The survey in Sorani:**

Average

**1.4**

**The survey in Farsi:**

Average

**1.4**


**The survey in English:**

Average

**1.0**

In the case of the Islamic Republic's collapse, How much do you trust the following forces to protect the Kurdistan cities and villages? On a scale of 0 to 10


Average



**Sorani Survey:**

1. People's volunteer forces from your own city or village
2. Peshmerga Forces
3. Guerrilla force
4. The United Nations Peace Keepers
5. Iranian Central Government Forces


Average



**Farsi Survey:**

1. People's volunteer forces from your own city or village
2. Peshmerga Forces
3. Guerrilla force
4. The United Nations Peace Keepers
5. Iranian Central Government Forces

Average



**English Survey:**

1. People's volunteer forces from your own city or village
2. Peshmerga Forces
3. The United Nations Peace Keepers
4. Iranian Central Government Forces
5. guerrilla force

Here, we observe a pattern similar to the previous multichoice slider rating questions. The indicators of higher polarized opinions are much higher among those who took the Survey in Farsi and English. However, the participants' trust rate in The Iranian Central Forces is still meager. This fact connects with the finding from the question, " If they find Kurdistan an occupied land." Those who took the survey in Farsi and English display somewhat more polarized attitudes toward Kurdish Armed Forces to the degree they have nullified the average ratings to below three. However, they share the same distrust of the central forces in Kurdistan.

On the other hand, among those who took the Survey in Sorani, we witness a high rate of homogenous attitude on this topic which is cohesive with previous multichoice slider rating questions.


We can look at the entire participants to further help to put this question in perspective. This is possible by combining all participants across the three languages and mixing the pool as a whole, with the majority of them using the Sorani language on a scale of 2.36 (Sorani Language) to 1(Farsi+English).

The result looks like the following:

1. People's volunteer forces from your own city or village: Average 5.02
2. Peshmerga Forces: Average 5.01
3. Guerrilla forces: Average 3.8
4. The United Nations Peace Keepers: Average 2.54
5. Central Government Forces: Average 1.19


To understand the participants' perspective about the future of Kurdish armed forces in case of the collapse of the Iranian government, we asked the following question:  
In the case of the Islamic Republic's collapse, what should become of the Kurdish armed forces?

### The survey in Sorani




78.9% Kurdistan Army  
10.9 Kurdistan Regional Security Forcer (Asayesh)  
5.5% I don't know  
2.2% Disbanded  
1.8% Dissolve into the Iranian Central Government Armed Forces  
0.8% Police

### The survey in Farsi



51.6% Kurdistan Army  
23.2% Kurdistan Regional Security Forcer (Asayesh)  
9.1% Dissolve into the Iranian Central Government Armed Forces  
8.4% I don't know  
3.5% Police  
4.3% Disbanded

**The survey in English**



58.8% Kurdistan Army

24.4% Kurdistan Regional Security Forces (Asayesh)

4.6% Dissolve into the Iranian Central Government Armed Forces

7.6% I don't know

3.1% Police

1.5% Disbanded